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In order to engage in a continuous social interaction, participants must be
able to dynamically understand, predict, and influence each other’s mental states
and actions, so as to enable a process of efficient and interactive grounding of
shared meaning. We follow the argument that the mentalizing network and the
mirror-neuron system in our social brain together provide the basis for these
abilities [1]. However, how these systems exactly operate and how they work
together is still unclear. Building on previous work on the interplay of mental-
izing and mirroring in embodied communication, here we lay out our modeling
approach together with simulation results that show how to solve the problem of
self-other distinction in a model of the sensorimotor system of interacting agents.
We believe this to be an important step that informs mentalizing, so that in the
future virtual agents equipped with this model can distinguish between own and
other’s mental states in complex social situations.
In a first step towards this goal, we developed a model of two distinct net-
works of the human social brain - mentalizing and mirroring - which allows them
to interact during embodied communication. The model connects a mentalizing
system based on simple heuristics for attributing and inferring different orders
of belief about own and other’s mental states, with a hierarchical predictive pro-
cessing model of online action perception and production based on the common
coding of underlying action representations [2]. To investigate the role of men-
talizing and mirroring interacting in inter-agent coordination and to test the
model, we conducted simulation experiments in which two virtual agents were
each equipped with this model. Different mentalizing capacity configurations
were tested, as well as different noise conditions, thus influencing the robustness
of the communication. The agents engage in non-verbal communication behavior
to which the embodied action representations in the mirroring system can res-
onate because of their close coupling of perception and production, while taking
uncertainty from noise into account. Resonating action representations inform
the mentalizing system, which in turn can guide successful interaction. Results
from our simulations on this first model demonstrate how mentalizing can afford
higher robustness of communication by enabling interactive grounding processes.
Although our model was able to act upon and infer beliefs about own and
other’s mental states, it could only produce or perceive an action at a time. Of
course, this is a special case of interaction that can occur, but in our dynamic
world our social brain has to cope with concurrent production and perception
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situations, e.g., dancing with a partner or playing a duet on the piano. Situa-
tions where you have to simultaneously keep track of your own actions while
coordinating with your interaction partner’s actions, all using the same sensori-
motor processes. Thus, as a starting point for an account of simultaneous action
and perception, the first step is to enable early self-other distinction within the
sensorimotor system, which we will use to distinguish ourselves from others so
that we do not falsely attribute an action outcome to ourselves. As research into
schizophrenia has shown, reliable and early self-other integration and distinction
is important not only for the correct attribution of a sense of agency, but also
for the correct attribution of intentions and emotions in social interactions [3].
We modeled two processes that have been identified in the literature, which
together can be integrated into a combined sense of agency. The predictive
process makes use of people’s ability to anticipate the sensory consequences of
their own actions. One account to model these processes is based on inverse and
forward models [4]. The second, postdictive process uses higher-level causal
beliefs like the intention to act [5] and temporal binding as mechanisms to infer
the consistency of the action outcome. The “temporal binding window” [6] de-
scribes the integration of sensory signals from multiple modalities, which selects
perceived actions and their outcomes for integration as long as they occur within
a narrow temporal window. Because we have more experience in predicting our
own body that window is more narrow for own action-outcomes than for other
people’s actions. Being able to make such a distinction allows people to monitor,
infer and distinguish between causal relations for own and other’s behavior.
But how do these two processes work together to inform a sense of agency
and what if cues for agency are unreliable? We extended our prediction-based
model of the sensorimotor system with a model of self-other distinction based
on postdictive and predictive cues and compared two ways of cue integration to
the literature on the sense of agency. In the predictive process, we modeled the
match or mismatch of the predicted action-outcome. In the postdictive process,
we modeled the intention to act and the delay in the action-outcome for temporal
binding (see [7] for more detail). It is not obvious from the literature how the
cues from the predictive and postdictive processes are being integrated. As a first
step, we test two simple ways to do so, namely, to connect them conjunctively or
disjunctively. A conjunctive connection would allow a sense of agency to occur
only if it is supported by both processes; in a disjunctive connection only one
cue would suffice to inform a sense of agency, in a more flexible but also more
error prone manner.
To test the extended model’s ability to differentiate between self and other we
simulated a social situation. In this situation, the model writes a character from
a learned set of handwritten characters of the alphabet while it either receives
the correct action-outcome as feedback, or it receives delayed or different feed-
back than expected. This way we simulate the effect of simultaneously perceiving
an interaction partner’s action. We tested three scenarios for each combination
to logically connect predictive and postdictive cues to form a sense of agency. In
the first scenario we trigger the intent to act out a motor schema and the model
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will perceive its own correct output as feedback. Here, the model receives both
cues correctly. In the second scenario we trigger the same intent to act, but the
model now receives its output with a delay, disrupting the postdictive cue. In
the third scenario the model again is triggered to act, while this time it receives
unpredicted action-outcomes.
Results from these simulations show that a disjunctive connection between
cues fares better, since it allows for a sense of agency even in dynamic scenarios
of simultaneous perception and production, with feedback either from own or
from other’s actions. This more flexible distinction is also supported by results
reported in the literature, e.g., [8] found that where the reliability of the predic-
tive process was reduced, the system put more weight on the post-hoc inferential
processes. Taken together, our modeling approach supports the motor system’s
role in social cognition. In future work we want to use the differentiating infor-
mation provided by the present model to inform higher-level cognition through
an interplay with the mentalizing system, to prepare virtual agents to distinguish
between own and other’s mental states in complex social situations.
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